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I. INTRODUCTION
I am pleased to have this opportunity to return to my consideration of the Ohio
Constitution.3 Cleveland-Marshall College of Law and the Law Review should be
commended for taking the Ohio Constitution seriously.4 This Law School, through
the work of Professor Steve Werber, has already made a major contribution to state
constitutional law through the analysis of Ohio’s controversial tort reform
confrontation between the Ohio Supreme Court and the Ohio Legislature.5 As
Professor Richard Kay of the University of Connecticut School of Law has observed:
The transformation of a law school from an institution of vocational
competence into one of intellectual excellence is often associated with an
increased attention to legal subjects that are national in scope....It is also
true, however, that this broadening of interest need not be accompanied by
1

This is an expanded version of a presentation made at Cleveland-Marshall College of
Law at a program entitled “The Ohio Constitution—Then and Now: An Examination of the
Law and History of the Ohio Constitution on the Occasion of Its Bicentennial,” on Friday,
April 25, 2003.
2

Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law, Camden; Associate
Director, Center for State Constitutional Studies.
3
Robert F. Williams, Introduction: State Constitutional Law in Ohio and in the Nation, 16
U. TOL. L. REV. 391 (1985).
4
See Robert C. Welsh & Ronald K.L. Collins, Taking State Constitutions Seriously,
CENTER MAG., Sept.-Oct. 1981, at 6.
5

Stephen J. Werber, Ohio Tort Reform in 1998: The War Continues, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
539 (1997); Stephen J. Werber, Ohio Tort Reform versus the Ohio Constitution, 69 TEMPLE L.
REV. 1155 (1996); Stephen J. Werber, Ohio: A Microcosm of Tort Reform versus State
Constitutional Mandates, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 1045 (2000).
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Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2004

1

416

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:415

an abandonment of a special concern for the legal issues and problems
that are peculiar to a law school’s home.6
State constitutions have far-reaching importance on questions of how we govern
ourselves, and have major consequences for state citizens beyond the area of rights
protections.7 Despite this fact, it is in the area of rights that state constitutional law
has received the most attention. The renewed interest in state constitutional rights,
referred to as the New Judicial Federalism (NJF), dates from the early 1970s.8 The
NJF describes the process in which state courts9 interpret their state constitutions to
provide rights beyond the national minimum (“federal floor”) of rights recognized by
the U.S. Supreme Court interpreting the federal constitution. This development was
referred to by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. as “probably the most important
development in constitutional jurisprudence of our times.”10 Jon Teaford has
recently argued that the NJF is an important element in the late twentieth-century rise
in importance of state government.11 Another scholar noted that “[w]ith the power to
6
Richard S. Kay, The Jurisprudence of the Connecticut Constitution, 16 CONN. L. REV.
667, 667 (1984) (paragraph break omitted).
7

See generally Robert F. Williams, The Brennan Lecture: Interpreting State Constitutions
as Unique Legal Documents, 27 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 189 (2002)[hereinafter Brennan
Lecture]; Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Law Processes, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV.
169 (1983).
8

See generally Robert F. Williams, Foreword: Looking Back at the New Judicial
Federalism’s First Generation, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. xiii (1996). Dr. G. Alan Tarr has argued
that prior to the beginning of the 1970s, the conditions were not right for the development of
an expansive state constitutional rights jurisprudence. He noted:
Only when circumstances brought a combination of state constitutional arguments,
plus an example of how a court might develop constitutional guarantees, could a state
civil liberties jurisprudence emerge. Put differently, when the Burger Court’s
anticipated — and to some extent actual — retreat from the Warren Court activism
encouraged civil liberties litigants to look elsewhere for redress, the experience of the
preceding decade had laid the foundation for the development of state civil liberties
law. Paradoxically, then, the activism of the Warren Court, which has been often
portrayed as detrimental to federalism, was a necessary condition for the emergence of
vigorous state involvement in protecting civil liberties.
G. Alan Tarr, The New Judicial Federalism in Perspective, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1097,
1111-12 (1997) (paragraph break omitted).
9

Federal courts, of course, may be faced with state constitutional questions under their
supplemental jurisdiction. See City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283
(1982); Robert A. Shapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State Constitutions in the Federal Courts,
87 CAL. L. REV. 1409 (1999).
10

Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Special Supplement, State Constitutional Law, NAT’L
L.J., Sept. 29, 1986, at S1; accord Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Symposium on the
Revolution in State Constitutional Law—Foreword, 13 VT. L. REV. 11, 11 (1988) (calling the
movement “the most significant development in American constitutional jurisprudence
today”); Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 495 (1977).
11

JON C. TEAFORD, THE RISE OF THE STATES: EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN STATE
GOVERNMENT 208-16 (2002). See also LAURA LANGER, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN STATE SUPREME
COURTS 1 (2002):

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol51/iss3/7

2

2004]

NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM IN OHIO

417

resolve the vast proportion of the nation’s legal disputes, and with recent shifts in
federal-state relations, the ability of state courts to affect the distribution of wealth
and power in the United States is at its zenith.”12
II. THE NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM IN OHIO
Despite its beginnings in the early 1970s, and its recognition by almost all states
in one case or another by the 1980s, Ohio was quite a latecomer.13 One explanation
for this is that there are substantial legitimacy questions that have been raised
concerning state courts’ willingness to “disagree” with the U.S. Supreme Court.14 As
noted by Alan Tarr:
For federal constitutional law, the primary legitimacy concern has
involved the relation between the United States Supreme Court and other
purportedly more democratic branches, such as Congress or state
legislatures. For state constitutional law, in contrast, the major legitimacy
concern has involved the relation between state courts and the U.S.
Supreme Court: when can a state court interpret its state guarantees to
reach a result different from that obtained by the Supreme Court
interpreting the Federal Constitution?15
For whatever reasons, and there are no doubt others, Ohio did not embrace the NJF
until only a decade ago, in the 1993 case of Arnold v. City of Cleveland.16 Arnold
has become the standard citation supporting the independent force of the Ohio
Constitution.

Increasingly judges on these state courts of last resort are called upon to determine the
constitutional fate of state legislation across a range of policy. As a result, many
policies governing the daily lives of citizens are resolved by the votes of state supreme
court justices; these actors often become the final arbiters of state public policy.
12

Melinda Gann Hall, State Judicial Politics: Rules, Structures, and the Political Game, in
AMERICAN STATE AND LOCAL POLITICS 114-15 (Ronald E. Weber & Paul Brace eds., 1999).
13

Mary Cornelia Porter & G. Alan Tarr, The New Judicial Federalism and the Ohio
Supreme Court: Anatomy of a Failure, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 143 (1984). For more recent literature
on the Ohio Supreme Court, see Paul D. Carrington & Adam R. Long, The Independence and
Democratic Accountability of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 455 (2002);
Robert S. Peck, Tort Reform’s Threat to an Independent Judiciary, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 835
(2002). See generally G. ALAN TARR & MARY CORNELIA ALDIS PORTER, STATE SUPREME
COURTS IN STATE AND NATION (1988).
14
See generally Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court’s Shadow: Legitimacy of State
Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. REV. 353 (1984) [hereinafter In
the Supreme Court’s Shadow]; Robert F. Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme Court:
Continuing Methodology and Legitimacy Problems in Independent State Constitutional Rights
Adjudication, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1015 (1997) [hereinafter In the Glare of the Supreme
Court].
15
G. Alan Tarr, Constitutional Theory and State Constitutional Interpretation, 22 RUTGERS
L.J. 841, 853 (1991). See also G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 175
(1998).
16

Arnold v. City of Cleveland, 67 Ohio St. 3d 35, 616 N.E.2d 163 (1993).
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A. Thrill of Discovery
The development of the NJF nationally has been characterized by three distinct
stages.17 The first is the “thrill of discovery” stage, most often characterized by a
single breakthrough or “teaching opinion”18 which declares the state constitution to
be an independent force, and serves as a wake-up call to the bench, bar, legal
academy, and media. The second stage, experienced in many states, is a “backlash”
against this independent approach to the state constitution, which often results in the
recognition of rights, often for criminal defendants, beyond the national minimum
standards established by the U.S. Supreme Court.19 Next, in the third stage, state
courts settled down to the long hard task of actually developing understandable
doctrines of judicial interpretation under the state constitution’s various provisions.20
Finally, a fourth stage that as of now is only an ideal, would reflect a true dialogue
between federal and state judges, as well as academic commentators on
constitutional theory, concerning the content of rights protection as a shared
enterprise between federal and state constitutional law.21
Professor Paul Kahn argued that state courts and federal courts should work
together, using both state constitutions and the U.S Constitution to pursue the
“common enterprise” of providing interpretive answers to great constitutional
questions.22 Professor Lawrence Friedman has elaborated the elements and benefits
of a true constitutional dialogue between state courts and the U.S. Supreme Court on
shared constitutional issues.23 Professor Friedman has argued that insofar as the NJF
reflects attempts by state courts independently to interpret the meaning of cognate
textual provisions, its legitimacy is buoyed by the federal constitutional value of
dialogue—that is, the value that attaches to discourse about law and governance that
occurs between and among the different organs of the federal and state
governments.24
Still, it must be remembered that each state constitution has its own text. The
textual focus is an important way to distinguish the interpretation of a state
constitution from the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretations of the federal
constitution.
17

Robert F. Williams, Introduction: The Third Stage of the New Judicial Federalism, 59
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 211 (2003).
18
Id. at 213; see Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme Court, supra note 14, at 1019
(describing a “teaching opinion” as “alerting the bar and bench to the possibilities of
independent state constitutional analysis and educating them in the techniques of making state
constitutional arguments”).
19

Williams, supra note 17, at 215.

20

Id. at 219. But see James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism,
90 MICH. L. REV. 761 (1992).
21

Williams, supra note 17, at 223.

22

Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 1147, 1168 (1993).
23

Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Value of Dialogue and the New Judicial
Federalism, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 93, 112-23 (2000).
24

Id. at 97.
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As noted above, the NJF burst on the scene in Ohio in the 1993 decision in
Arnold v. City of Cleveland.25 This was a challenge to the City of Cleveland’s ban
on assault weapons. The Ohio Supreme Court emphasized the differing language
under the Ohio Constitution in comparison to the federal Second Amendment.
Article I, Section 4 of the Ohio Constitution provides:
The people have the right to bear arms for their defense and security; but
standing armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, and shall not
be kept up; and the military shall be in strict subordination to the civil
power.26
The emphasis on textual differences between the federal and state constitutions has
been one of the earliest and most persuasive features of the NJF. Alan Tarr has
pointed out the appeal of textualism, in addition to historical analysis, as a method to
support a state constitutional decision going beyond federal constitutional minimum
standards.27
A second very influential element of state constitutional interpretation in the NJF
has been reliance on the history of the provision being interpreted.28 In Arnold the
Ohio Supreme Court noted, however, that both the 1802 and 1851 versions of the
Right to Bear Arms Clause were adopted without debate in those respective
constitutional conventions.29
The Ohio Supreme Court acknowledged that it had not until then been a
participant in the NJF, cited the article that declared its performance “a failure,”30
and issued its Declaration of Ohio State Constitutional Independence:
In joining the growing trend in other states, we believe that the Ohio
Constitution is a document of independent force. In the areas of
individual rights and civil liberties, the United States Constitution, where
applicable to the states, provides a floor below which state court decisions
may not fall. As long as state courts provide at least as much protection
25

67 Ohio St. 3d 35, 616 N.E.2d 163 (1993).

26

OHIO CONST. art. I, § 4.

27

Tarr, supra note 15, at 847-48 (“[E]ven when state and federal constitutions contained
analogous provisions, the language of the provisions often differed; and where these textual
differences were substantial, they seemed to call for independent interpretation. This was
especially true when it could be shown that the textual differences reflected a distinctive
historical experience or were designed to incorporate a particular perspective.”); see also
Joseph R. Grodin, Commentary: Some Reflections on State Constitutions, 15 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 391, 400 (1988) (“The presence of distinctive language or history obviously
presents the most comfortable context for relying upon independent state grounds.”); Peter
Linzer, Why Bother with State Bills of Rights?, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1573, 1584-85, 1607-08, 1610
(1990).
28

Tarr, supra note 15, at 848 (“[I]f a divergent interpretation may be justified by reference
to the distinctive origins or purpose of a provision, then state jurists must pay particular
attention to the intent of the framers and to the historical circumstances out of which the
constitutional provisions arose.”).
29

67 Ohio St. 3d at 43, 616 N.E.2d at 169.

30

Id. at 42 n.8, 616 N.E.2d at 168 n.8.
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as the United States Supreme Court has provided in its interpretation of
the federal Bill of Rights, state courts are unrestricted in according greater
civil liberties and protections to individuals and groups.31
The court went on, however, to note that no rights are unlimited, and that the state’s
police power always has to be considered a counter force to assertions of rights. On
this basis, it concluded that Cleveland’s specific ban on assault weapons was
reasonable under the circumstances and would be upheld.32
B. NJF Methodology
After Arnold, questions arose in Ohio, as they have in all states that embark on
the NJF, as to what techniques and methodology the court should use when
interpreting state constitutional rights guarantees, which of those rights should be
construed more expansively than their federal analogues, and under what
circumstances would such an outcome be appropriate. This article now turns to
some preliminary observations on these matters, without purporting to be an
exhaustive analysis of Ohio’s state constitutional rights decisions of the last decade.
I have referred to U.S. Supreme Court decisions denying rights claims as the
“middle” of American constitutional litigation,33 and expansive state court decisions
after the Supreme Court’s rejection of similar federal constitutional claims as
“second looks” at constitutional issues.34 This is no longer, as noted above, a recent
phenomenon. One commentator noted bluntly almost twenty years ago: “The ‘new
federalism’ isn’t new anymore.”35 But it is not the absence of judicial activism that
should be criticized. Rather, it is the Ohio courts’ apparent failure, until recently,
seriously to consider state constitutional claims, regardless of the ultimate outcome,
that merits criticism. Win or lose, state constitutional arguments must still be
considered and analyzed.
In a 1997 decision, State v. Robinette,36 the Ohio Supreme Court considered
whether, as a matter of state constitutional search and seizure law, a police officer
must inform a person that he is “free to go” after a valid traffic stop. The court had
earlier concluded in the same litigation that, under both the federal and state
constitutions, such a statement had to be given.37 The court’s opinion did not contain
a “plain statement” that its decision was based on an adequate and independent state

31

Id. at 42, 616 N.E.2d at 168-69. See also State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Ohio Bureau of
Workers’ Compensation, 97 Ohio St. 3d 504, 514, 780 N.E.2d 981, 991-92 (2002) (declaring
in a search and seizure case that Ohio’s constitution is a “document of independent force”).
32

67 Ohio St. 3d at 44-49, 616 N.E.2d at 170-73.

33

Williams, In the Supreme Court’s Shadow, supra note 14, at 360.

34

Id. at 361.

35

Ronald K.L. Collins, Foreword: Reliance on State Constitutions—Beyond the “New
Federalism,” 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. vi (1984); Ronald K.L. Collins, Foreword: The Once
“New Judicial Federalism” and Its Critics, 64 WASH. L. REV. 5 (1989).
36

80 Ohio St. 3d 234, 685 N.E.2d 762 (1997).

37

State v. Robinette, 73 Ohio St. 3d 650, 653 N.E.2d 695 (1995).
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law ground, as required by the U.S. Supreme Court in Michigan v. Long.38 There,
the U.S. Supreme Court had stated:
Accordingly, when, as in this case, a state court decision fairly appears to
rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with federal law, and
when the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is
not clear from the face of the opinion, we will accept as the most
reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did
because it believed that federal law required it to do so. If a state court
chooses merely to rely on federal precedents as it would on the precedents
of all other jurisdictions, then it need only make clear by a plain statement
in its judgment or opinion that the federal cases are being used only for
the purpose of guidance, and do not themselves compel the result that the
court has reached. In this way, both justice and judicial administration
will be greatly improved. If the state court decision indicates clearly and
expressly that it is alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and
independent grounds, we, of course, will not undertake to review the
decision.39
In Robinette, therefore, the U.S. Supreme Court was able to accept the case for
review and reversed on the federal constitutional ground, remanding the case to the
Ohio Supreme Court.40
The procedural history of Robinette provides a perfect illustration of Justice
Stevens’s objections to the Michigan v. Long approach. In dissenting from that
decision, Justice Stevens had criticized the majority for adopting a presumption of
U.S. Supreme Court jurisdiction:
These are not cases in which an American citizen has been deprived of a
right secured by the United States Constitution or a federal statute.
Rather, they are cases in which a state court has upheld a citizen’s
assertion of a right, finding the citizen to be protected under both federal
and state law. The complaining party is an officer of the state itself, who
asks us to rule that the state court interpreted federal rights too broadly
and “overprotected” the citizen. Such cases should not be of inherent
concern to this Court.
****

38
463 U.S. 1032 (1983). A survey of over 500 decisions, from all 50 states, between the
time of the Michigan v. Long decision and the beginning of 1988, concluded that “few states
have adopted a consistent, concise way of communicating the bases for their constitutional
decisions.” Felicia A. Rosenfield, Fulfilling the Goals of Michigan v. Long: The State Court
Reaction, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 1041, 1068 (1988). See generally Richard W. Westling,
Comment, Advisory Opinions and the “Constitutionally Required” Adequate and Independent
State Grounds Doctrine, 63 TULANE L. REV. 379 (1988); Stewart G. Pollock, Adequate and
Independent State Grounds as a Means of Balancing the Relationship Between State and
Federal Courts, 63 TEX. L. REV. 977 (1985); Eric B. Schnurer, The Inadequate and Dependent
“Adequate and Independent State Grounds” Doctrine, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 371 (1991).
39

463 U.S. at 1040-41.

40

Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996).
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Until recently we had virtually no interest in cases of this type....Some
time during the past decade...our priorities shifted. The result is a docket
swollen with requests by states to reverse judgments that their courts have
rendered in favor of their citizens. I am confident that a future Court will
recognize the error of this allocation of resources. When that day comes, I
think it likely that the Court will also reconsider the propriety of today’s
expansion of our jurisdiction.41
Three years later, Justice Stevens continued his critique in Delaware v. Van
Arsdale:42
Even if the Court is unconcerned by the waste inherent in review of such
cases, even if it is unmoved by the incongruity between the wholly
precatory nature of our pronouncements on such occasions and Art. III’s
prohibition of advisory opinions, it should be concerned by the inevitable
intrusion upon the prerogatives of state courts that can only provide a
potential source of friction and thereby threaten to undermine the respect
on which we must depend for the faithful, conscientious application of
this Court’s expositions of federal law. Less obvious is the impact on
mutual trust when the state court on remand—perhaps out of misplaced
sense of duty—confines its state constitution to the boundaries marked by
this Court for the Federal Constitution.43
Justice Stevens went on to suggest that state courts follow the primacy or “firstthings-first” approach, rather than the interstitial approach, as a way of clearly
differentiating their state constitutional from federal constitutional analysis.44
In any event, on remand the Ohio Supreme Court reconsidered its earlier
conclusion that the state constitution (in addition to the federal constitution) required
a “free to go” statement by law enforcement officials after a valid traffic stop. The
court, noting the identical state and federal constitutional texts, and relying on earlier
decisions, decided to adopt the U.S. Supreme Court’s view of the Fourth
Amendment as the authoritative judicial interpretation of the state constitutional
search and seizure clause. The court relied specifically on its 1981 decision State v.
Geraldo, where it had stated:
It is our opinion that the reach of Section 14, Article I of the Ohio
Constitution with respect to the warrantless monitoring of a consenting
informant’s telephone conversation is coextensive with that of the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. As a consequence thereof,
appellant’s failure to prove a violation of the Fourth Amendment dictates

41
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. at 1067-68, 1069-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (paragraph
break omitted).
42

475 U.S. 673 (1986).

43

Id. at 699 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (paragraph break omitted).

44

Id. at 701-07 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For a description of the primacy approach, see
Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme Court, supra note 14, at 1018.
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the conclusion that his rights under Section 14, Article I of the Ohio
Constitution have not been violated either.45
The court noted the need for uniformity in this area of criminal procedure, and noted
that in the future, in the absence of “persuasive reasons to find otherwise,” it would
follow the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretations of the Fourth Amendment as a
matter of Ohio constitutional law.46 The Ohio Supreme Court seems to have adopted
the “interstitial”47 approach to the NJF, stating that after the federal Bill of Rights
was made applicable to the states, “the United States Constitution became the
primary mechanism to safeguard an individual’s rights.”48 Under the interstitial
approach, a state court looks first to the federal constitution and only if the rights
claimant does not prevail on that claim does the court reach the state constitutional
claim, relying on the state constitution to fill in gaps in federal constitutional
protections.49
The decision by the Ohio Supreme Court in Robinette could be seen as an
example of Justice Stevens’s warning about the “misplaced sense of duty” that state
courts might feel after the U.S. Supreme Court made its ruling in a case based on
both the state and federal constitutions. On the other hand, Robinette can also be
seen as an example of “reflective adoptionism,” as described by Dr. Barry Latzer:
It is illogical, the argument runs, to retract state constitutional rights
simply because the Supreme Court has not found those rights in the U.S.
Constitution. This argument is quite persuasive if the premise of
unreflective adoptionism is correct. However, if the state courts are not
merely presuming that state and federal law are alike, but are coming to
this conclusion after independent evaluation of the meaning of the state
provision, then the critique collapses. There is nothing improper in
concluding that the Supreme Court’s construction of similar text is sound.
Adoptionism is not per se unjustifiable.50

45

80 Ohio St. 3d at 239, 685 N.E.2d at 767 (citing State v. Geraldo, 68 Ohio St. 2d 120,
126, 429 N.E.2d 141, 146 (1981)). See also State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St. 3d 86, 87 n.1, 565
N.E.2d 1271, 1273 n.1 (1991).
46
80 Ohio St. 3d at 239, 685 N.E.2d at 767. The court cited two cases for the proposition
that it had applied the “persuasive reasons” approach to several other provisions. Id. at 238,
685 N.E.2d at 766. See Eastwood Mall, Inc. v. Slanco, 68 Ohio St. 3d 221, 222-23, 626
N.E.2d 59, 60 (1994); State v. Gustafson, 76 Ohio St. 3d 425, 432, 668 N.E.2d 435, 441
(1996). In fact, although both of these cases interpret the Ohio Constitution coextensively
with the federal Constitution, neither of them mentions the “persuasive reasons” approach.
47

Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme Court, supra note 14, at 1018.

48

80 Ohio St. 3d at 237, 685 N.E.2d at 766.

49

See, e.g., Stewart G. Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental
Rights, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 707, 708 (1983) (“The challenge is to develop a jurisprudence of
state constitutional law, a jurisprudence that will make more predictable the recourse to and
the results of state constitutional law analysis.”); Developments in the Law: The Interpretation
of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1326, 1361 (1982).
50

Barry Latzer, The New Judicial Federalism and Criminal Justice: Two Problems and a
Response, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 863, 864 (1991) (paragraph break omitted).
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Dr. Latzer also noted that “law ambiguity...refers to cases in which the state court
fails to make clear, in its judicial opinion, whether the decision was based on an
interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, the State Constitution or both.”51 He
concluded:
Even law-ambiguity may be viewed as a mark of caution: perhaps the
failure to “commit” state law to a position is a way of preserving future
interpretive options, so that the court could someday say that the previous
case was not construing the state constitution after all. In any event, one
point is clear beyond question: state constitutional law is not just about
broadening rights that the Supreme Court has narrowed.52
C. Backlash—The Criteria Approach?
There is another important element contained in the Ohio Supreme Court’s
decision on remand in Robinette. In stating that it would follow the U.S. Supreme
Court’s interpretations of the Fourth Amendment when interpreting the Ohio
Constitution’s Search and Seizure Clause, the Ohio court seems to have been
creating a “presumption of correctness” for U.S. Supreme Court decisions, at least in
the area of search and seizure. While it did not define what might constitute
“persuasive reasons to find otherwise,” this approach can be seen as a tentative
adoption of the “criteria” approach. I have described the “criteria approach” as
follows:
Under this methodology, the state supreme court...sets forth a list of
circumstances (criteria or factors) under which it says it will feel justified
in interpreting its state constitution more broadly than the Federal
Constitution. These criteria, then, are used by advocates to present, and
judges to decide, claims made under the state constitution in cases where
there is also a federal claim that is unlikely to prevail. On the one hand,
the criteria approach is laudable because it teaches and calls attention to
the nature of state constitutional arguments. On the other hand, however,
I have been critical of this approach for a number of reasons that I believe
have demonstrated themselves in the past fifteen years.53
A number of states that follow the “interstitial” approach to state constitutional rights
interpretation have attempted to set forth criteria, or factors, which might be relied on
by the court to justify a more expansive interpretation of a state constitutional clause
despite a contrary ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court. This criteria approach,
although it serves positive functions in terms of educating the lower bench and the
bar, has the potential to be a substantially limiting doctrine with respect to
independent state constitutional interpretation.
Although the Ohio Supreme Court does not seem to have expanded its
“persuasive reasons,” or tentative criteria approach, beyond the search and seizure

51

Barry Latzer, Into the 90s: More Evidence that the Revolution Has a Conservative
Underbelly, 4 EMERGING ISSUES IN STATE CONST. L. 17, 21 (1991).
52

Id. at 32.

53

See Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme Court, supra note 14, at 1021-22.
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area, it recently applied this approach retroactively. In a 2002 decision in State v.
Murrell,54 the court reexamined its 1992 search and seizure decision in State v.
Brown.55 Although Brown had attempted to distinguish the controlling U.S.
Supreme Court interpretation of the federal Constitution, the Murrell court
determined that the attempted distinction was based on a faulty understanding of the
Supreme Court decision.56 The court, therefore, had to decide whether to reaffirm
Brown and interpret the Ohio Constitution’s search and seizure clause more
expansively than the federal constitutional requirements, on the one hand, or to
overrule Brown, on the other hand. Determining that there were no “persuasive
reasons” for diverging from federal analysis, either originally in 1992 or in 2002, the
court determined to overrule Brown.57
As an aside, the Ohio Supreme Court, like most state supreme courts, did not
consider whether the doctrine of stare decisis was any different in state constitutional
law from its federal constitutional law counterpart. In other words, even though
federal constitutional precedents are said to be only correctable by the U.S. Supreme
Court itself because of the relative difficulty of amending the federal Constitution,
state constitutional precedents might not be considered in the same light because of
the relative ease of amending state constitutions.58
It is also important to note that in the search and seizure context, courts rarely
have to consider the constitutionality of a statute.59 It is, rather, the actions of
executive branch law enforcement officers that must be considered. This distinction
has been recognized by the Ohio Supreme Court.60
I have associated the development of a criteria approach with the onset of a stage
two backlash in the evolution of the New Judicial Federalism. Ohio’s version is
rather mild, and in applying the criteria approach to search and seizure cases, the
Ohio Supreme Court is in the company of a number of other states that see the value
of uniformity in search and seizure doctrine.61 It remains to be seen, of course,
whether the Ohio Supreme Court will expand its “persuasive reasons” approach into
other areas of rights protection under the state constitution. The Arnold decision, of
course, with its emphasis on textual difference, relies on the criterion that is number
one on most states’ lists of reasons they will consider diverging from federal
constitutional law.

54

94 Ohio St. 3d 489, 764 N.E.2d 986 (2002).

55

63 Ohio St. 3d 349, 588 N.E.2d 113 (1992).

56

94 Ohio St. 3d at 493, 764 N.E.2d at 990.

57

Id. at 495-96, 764 N.E.2d at 993.

58

Williams, Brennan Lecture, supra note 7, at 227-29.

59

Id. at 221.

60

City of Cleveland v. Trzebuckowski, 85 Ohio St. 3d 524, 531 n.2, 709 N.E.2d 1148,
1153 n.2 (1999).
61
See, e.g., State v. Florance, 527 P.2d 1202, 1209 (Or. 1974); People v. Gonzalez, 465
N.E.2d 823, 825 (N.Y. 1984). See generally Earl M. Maltz, The Dark Side of State Court
Activism, 63 TEX. L. REV. 995, 1006-23 (1985).
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D. Distinctive Text: Religion
In 2000 the Ohio Supreme Court considered another case involving a substantial
textual distinction between the federal and state constitutions. In Humphrey v.
Lane,62 the court considered a free exercise of religion claim by a Native American
who, for religious reasons, wanted to wear long hair despite a Department of
Corrections regulation to the contrary.63 Here, again, the court confronted a claim
that did not require it to evaluate the constitutionality of a statute, but rather an
executive branch administrative regulation.64 The court noted the substantial
distinction between the texts of the First Amendment and Ohio’s Article I, Section 7.
The Ohio provision reads:
All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God
according to the dictates of their own conscience. No person shall be
compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or maintain
any form of worship, against his consent; and no preference shall be
given, by law, to any religious society; nor shall any interference with the
rights of conscience be permitted. No religious test shall be required, as a
qualification for office, nor shall any person be incompetent to be a
witness on account of his religious belief; but nothing herein shall be
construed to dispense with oaths and affirmations. Religion, morality, and
knowledge, however, being essential to good government, it shall be the
duty of the General Assembly to pass suitable laws, to protect every
religious denomination in the peaceable enjoyment of its own mode of
public worship, and to encourage schools and the means of instruction.65
Assessing the structural differences in the provisions, the court noted that, by
contrast to the First Amendment, “the Ohio Constitution contains a section devoted
entirely to freedom of religion.”66 The court was very specific in describing its
federal-state textual comparison:
Verbiage does not indicate commitment to an ideal. The one phrase in the
United States Constitution regarding the freedom of religion is one of the
most powerful statements in human history. Ohio’s more detailed
description of the right does not by itself prove that Ohio’s framers
created a broader freedom of religion than exists in the United States
Constitution. However, the words of the Ohio framers do indicate their
intent to make an independent statement on the meaning and extent of the
freedom. Whether that statement creates a relevant difference is the

62

89 Ohio St. 3d 62, 728 N.E.2d 1039 (2000).

63

Id. at 62-64, 728 N.E.2d at 1041-42.

64

See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.

65

OHIO CONST. art. I, § 7. See generally G. Alan Tarr, Church and State in the States, 64
WASH. L. REV. 73 (1989).
66

89 Ohio St. 3d at 66, 728 N.E.2d at 1043.
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question we face today. In employing our comparison we are not doing a
mere word count, but instead are looking for a qualitative difference.67
The court concluded that the tests under this provision required a compelling state
interest to justify the restriction on religious practice, as well as the least restrictive
alternative. The court held that the state did have a compelling interest, but that it
had not chosen the least restrictive alternative to accomplish that interest.68
In the Humphrey situation, there was a very clear federal constitutional
conclusion that the rights claimant would not be protected. This was clear from the
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Employment Division v. Smith,69 which had fairly
recently changed federal First Amendment analysis of free exercise of religion
claims. Knowing that, in the past, it had followed federal analysis despite the wide
textual distinctions, the court indicated that it was not now willing to follow the new
Smith test for a free exercise of religion claim.70 The court did not make any attempt
to specify any “persuasive reasons otherwise.” It is true, of course, as noted above,
that textual differences constitute the most persuasive reason for divergent state
constitutional interpretation. Interestingly, however, just the year before, the Ohio
Supreme Court, in an establishment of religion claim, had rejected arguments based
on the same textual distinctions, and decided to follow the U.S. Supreme Court’s
Lemon71 test and not to diverge from it.72
That 1999 decision, Simmons-Harris v. Goff, was a challenge to Ohio’s school
voucher statute. The Ohio Supreme Court stated that the federal and Ohio religion
provisions were “the approximate equivalent.”73 The court noted that it had “had
little cause to examine” the Ohio clause and had “never enunciated a standard for
determining whether a statute violates it.”74 The court proceeded to adopt the federal
constitutional Lemon test,75 but did not conclude that the federal and state provisions
were “coextensive,”76 nor did it commit to “irreversibly tie ourselves” to the federal
constitutional standards.77 Citing Arnold, it stated:
67

Id. at 66-67, 728 N.E.2d at 1043-44 (paragraph break omitted).

68

Id. at 71, 728 N.E.2d at 1047. The identical Department of Corrections hair-length
regulation had survived a First Amendment challenge in federal court, in litigation that did not
raise a state constitutional claim. Blanken v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corrections, 944 F.
Supp. 1359 (S.D. Ohio 1996). On state constitutional claims in federal court, see supra note 7.
69

494 U.S. 872 (1990). See Stuart G. Parsell, Note, Revitalization of the Free Exercise of
Religion Under State Constitutions: A Response to Employment Division v. Smith, 68 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 747 (1993).
70

89 Ohio St. 3d at 68, 728 N.E.2d at 1044-45.

71

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).

72

Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 86 Ohio St. 3d 1, 711 N.E.2d 203 (1999).

73

Id. at 10, 711 N.E.2d at 211.

74

Id. at 10, 711 N.E.2d at 211.

75

See supra note 71.

76

86 Ohio St. 3d at 10, 711 N.E.2d at 211.

77

Id. at 10, 711 N.E.2d at 212.
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We reserve the right to adopt a different constitutional standard pursuant
to the Ohio Constitution, whether because the federal constitutional
standard changes or for any other relevant reason.78
Of course, it was because “the federal constitutional standard chang[ed]” that the
court in Humphrey, just a year later, gave independent force to Article I, Section 7 in
the free-exercise, long-hair case.79
E. Equal Protection: More Distinctive Text
In 2002 the Ohio Supreme Court decided the latest in a line of cases interpreting
Article I, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution, which provides:
All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for
their equal protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter, reform,
or abolish the same, whenever they may deem it necessary; and no special
privileges or immunities shall ever be granted, that may not be altered,
revoked, or repealed by the General Assembly.80
In State v. Thompson,81 the court considered a challenge to Ohio’s “importuning”
statute, which prohibited persons of the same gender, but not those of the opposite
gender, from soliciting sex acts from others. In an earlier decision, the court had
saved this statute from a free speech challenge under the state constitution by
imposing a limiting interpretation requiring “fighting words.”82 Because the free
speech claim was no longer available,83 the court entertained an equal protection
challenge. Relying on an earlier case,84 the court reiterated its view that Ohio’s
“equal protection” provision was “functionally equivalent” to the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause.85 It therefore applied the federal levels of
scrutiny analysis, concluding that the statute was “facially invalid as a content-based
restriction on speech, which by extension violates the equal protection guarantees
both United States and Ohio Constitutions.”86 The court, once again, failed to
provide any “plain statement” under Michigan v. Long,87 and therefore this decision
was potentially reviewable by the U.S. Supreme Court on the federal constitutional
78

Id. at 10, 711 N.E.2d at 212 (emphasis added).

79

See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.

80

OHIO CONST. art. I, § 2 (emphasis added). See Williams, supra note 3, at 395 (referring
to art. I, § 2 as a “potentially interesting Equal Protection and Benefit clause”).
81

95 Ohio St. 3d 264, 767 N.E.2d 251 (2002).

82

State v. Phipps, 58 Ohio St. 2d 271, 389 N.E.2d 1128 (1979).

83

95 Ohio St. 3d at 265-66, 767 N.E.2d at 254-55. The concurring opinion would have
ruled on free speech and overruled the earlier case. Id. at 273, 767 N.E.2d at 260-61 (Pfeifer,
J., concurring).
84

American Association of University Professors v. Central State University, 87 Ohio St.
3d 55, 717 N.E.2d 286 (1999).
85

95 Ohio St. 3d at 266, 767 N.E.2d at 255.

86

Id. at 266, 767 N.E.2d at 255.

87

See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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ground. The State, however, did not seek review in the U.S. Supreme Court,
probably because it had substantial doubts itself as to the constitutionality of the
statute.88
As authority for its “functionally equivalent” approach to state equal protection,
the Ohio Supreme Court cited its 1999 decision in American Association of
University Professors v. Central State University.89 This was another situation where
the court had ruled earlier on both federal and state constitutional grounds,90 the U.S.
Supreme Court accepted the case and reversed,91 and the case returned on remand to
the Ohio Supreme Court. There was a clearly independent state constitutional
equality argument made92 and rejected93 by the court. The Ohio Supreme Court’s
“functionally equivalent,” lockstep approach seems to have been applied
consistently,94 at least since 1937.95
Ohio’s Article I, Section 2 is, of course, both textually distinct from the
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause, as well as emanating from a
different period in history, and, undoubtedly, being aimed at a different set of
concerns from those at which the federal constitutional provision was aimed after the
Civil War. There are a number of states which, like Ohio, equate their different
equality provisions with the federal Equal Protection Clause, so Ohio’s position is
not unusual. This approach does, however, fail to acknowledge the differing text,
history, and purposes of its state constitutional equality guarantees.96 Other states
88

95 Ohio St. 3d at 266, 767 N.E.2d at 255.

89

87 Ohio St. 3d 55, 717 N.E.2d 286 (1999).

90

American Association of University Professors v. Central State University, 83 Ohio St.
3d 229, 233, 699 N.E.2d 463, 467 (1998) (“These two provisions are functionally equivalent,
and the standards for determining violations of equal protection are essentially the same under
state and federal law.”).
91
Central State University v. American Association of University Professors, 526 U.S. 124
(1999). Justice Stevens, predictably, dissented:
Seven of the eleven Ohio judges who reviewed the case concluded that the Ohio
statute violated the Ohio Constitution. Indeed, the majority opinion of the Ohio
Supreme Court did not cite a single case decided by this Court. If the State Supreme
Court did misconstrue the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution, the
impact of that arguable error is of consequence only in the State of Ohio, and will, in
any event, turn out to be totally harmless if that court adheres to its previously
announced interpretation of the State Constitution. I therefore believe that the Court
should deny the petition for certiorari.
Id. at 131-32 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (paragraph break omitted).
92

87 Ohio St. 3d at 56-60, 717 N.E.2d at 289-91.

93

Id. at 60, 717 N.E.2d at 291.

94

See, e.g., State ex rel. Dayton Fraternal Order of Police v. State Employment Relations
Bd., 22 Ohio St. 3d 1, 6, 488 N.E.2d 181, 185 (1986); Fabrey v. McDonald Police Dept., 70
Ohio St. 3d 351, 353, 639 N.E.2d 31, 33 (1994).
95

State ex rel. Struble v. Davis, 132 Ohio St. 555, 560, 9 N.E.2d 684, 687 (1937)
(“substantially the same”).
96
See generally Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in State Constitutional Law, 63
TEX. L. REV. 1195, 1196 (1985) (“Most state constitutions do not contain an ‘equal protection’
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that initially equated their equality clauses with federal doctrines have begun to
move in the direction of independence.
States like Indiana,97 Vermont,98
99
100
101
Minnesota, Alaska, and Idaho have been moving to decouple their state
constitutional equality doctrines from the formerly dominant federal equal protection
analysis.
It should also be noted that the Ohio Constitution contains another clause—
Article I, Section 1—that has been interpreted in other states to provide a guarantee
of equality. Article I, Section 1 provides:
All men are, by nature, free and independent, and have certain inalienable
rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty,
acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and seeking and obtaining
happiness and safety.102
States like New Jersey have interpreted these provisions as the basis for their
equality jurisprudence.103 The Ohio Constitution contains, as well, a number of other
provisions reflecting equality concerns, such as the requirements of uniformity in
taxation,104 and that general laws have a uniform operation throughout the state.105

clause. But they do contain a variety of equality protections.”). For further elaboration of the
differences between federal equal protection and state equality provisions, see Robert F.
Williams, A “Row of Shadows”: Pennsylvania’s Misguided Lockstep Approach to Its State
Constitutional Equality Doctrine, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 343 (1993); Robert F. Williams,
Foreword: The Importance of an Independent State Constitutional Equality Doctrine in
School Finance Cases and Beyond, 24 CONN. L. REV. 675 (1992). For an excellent treatment
of equality provisions in state constitutions, see 1 JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND DEFENSES 3-1 to 3-55 (3d ed. 2000).
97

See, e.g., Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72 (Ind. 1994).

98

See, e.g., Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). See also Robert F. Williams, Old
Constitutions and New Issues: National Lessons From Vermont’s State Constitutional Case on
Marriage of Same-Sex Couples, 43 B.C. L. REV. 73 (2001).
99

See, e.g., Ann L. Iijima, Minnesota Equal Protection in the Third Millennium: “Old
Formulations” or “New Articulations”?, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 338, 348-81 (1994)
(discussing deviations between the Minnesota Supreme Court’s interpretation of the state and
federal equal protection clauses).
100

See, e.g., Matanuska-Susitna Borough Sch. Dist. v. State, 931 P.2d 391, 402 (Alaska
1997); Paul E. McGreal, Alaska Equal Protection: Constitutional Law or Common Law?, 15
ALASKA L. REV. 1, 11-17 (1995); Michael B. Wise, Northern Lights—Equal Protection
Analysis in Alaska, 3 ALASKA L. REV. 1 (1986).
101
See, e.g., Concerned Taxpayers of Kootenai County v. Kootenai County, 50 P.3d 991,
994 (Idaho 2002). But see Rudeen v. Cenarrusa, 38 P.3d 598, 606-07 (Idaho 2001).
102
OHIO CONST. art. I, § 1. See Williams, supra note 3, at 395 n.27 (noting potential of art.
I, § 1).
103

ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE NEW JERSEY STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 2930 (rev. ed. 1997).
104

OHIO CONST. art. XII, § 2.

105

OHIO CONST. art. II, § 26.
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Critics of the federal equal protection approach point to a number of reasons for
developing an independent approach to interpreting equality provisions. For
example, Professor Lawrence Sager pointed out that the federal Equal Protection
Clause is among the most “underenforced” of federal constitutional provisions.106
This underenforcement pattern is due to the deference to states because of concerns
for federalism, the rigid application of the state-action requirement, and the tiered
“suspect class/levels of scrutiny” constructs imposed by the U.S. Supreme Court.107
Thus, federal equal protection decisions should hardly be viewed as limiting the
interpretation of state constitutional equality provisions.
In addition, several years after Professor Sager offered his underenforcement
thesis, he described another important reason why state courts should not blindly
follow federal constitutional interpretations.108 Describing the substantial role of
“strategic” considerations in judicial enforcement of constitutional norms, Professor
Sager identified the possibility of state and federal courts employing different
strategies in constitutional interpretation: “Like other legal rules, constitutional rules
bear pragmatic, strategic relationship to the concerns that animate them. Norms of
political morality comprise the targets of constitutional law, but not the necessary or
exclusive content of its rules.”109 He noted that strategic concerns account, in part,
for the Supreme Court’s limiting equal protection doctrines.110 State courts,
interpreting their own constitutions, may see the need to employ different strategies,
even though they are applying a similar “norm of political morality” equality.111
Sager concluded:
State judges confront institutional environments and histories that vary
dramatically from state to state, and that differ, in any one state, from the
homogenized, abstracted, national vision from which the Supreme Court
is forced to operate. It is natural and appropriate that in fashioning

106
Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1218-20 (1978).
107

Professor Sager stated:
While there is no litmus test for distinguishing these norms, there are indicia of
underenforcement. These include a disparity between the scope of federal judicial
construct and that of plausible understandings of the constitutional concept from
which it derives, the presence in court opinions of frankly institutional explanations
for setting particular limits to a federal judicial construct, and other anomalies.
Id. at 1218-19.
108

Professor Sager asked, “[T]o what extent, if any, should state judges faced with claims
under provisions of their state constitutions feel themselves bound to defer to Supreme Court
interpretations of equivalent federal constitutional provisions?” Lawrence G. Sager,
Foreword: State Courts and the Strategic Space Between the Norms and Rules of
Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 959, 959 (1985); see also Linzer, supra note 27, at 1580
(“The gut issue, though, is how closely the state courts should follow federal precedents in
applying their states’ provisions.”).
109

Sager, supra note 108, at 962 (emphasis in original).

110

Id. at 974.

111

Id. at 967.
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constitutional rules the state judges’ instrumental impulses and judgments
differ.
****
In light of the substantial strategic element in the composition of
constitutional rules, the sensitivity of strategic concerns to variations in
the political and social climate, the differences in the regulatory scope of
the federal and state judiciaries, the diversity of state institutions, and the
special familiarity of state judges with the actual working of those
institutions, variations among state and federal constitutional rules ought
to be both expected and welcomed.112
F. Free Speech: Still More Distinctive Text
In a 1994 decision, Eastwood Mall, Inc. v. Slanco,113 the Ohio Supreme Court
confronted the question, faced by a number of states,114 whether an injunction against
picketing and leafletting in a privately-owned shopping mall violated Article I,
Section 11 of the Ohio Constitution:
Every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of the right; and no law shall be
passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech, or of the press.115
There was a “well settled” negative answer to this question under the federal First
Amendment. Because there was no “state action,” the U.S. Supreme Court had
already ruled against the identical claim.116
The court acknowledged the substantial textual differences between the federal
and Ohio provisions, and the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court had observed that
states might recognize free speech rights in shopping malls,117 but it concluded,
relying on a 1992 case,118 “that the free speech guarantees accorded by the Ohio
Constitution are no broader than the First Amendment, and that the First Amendment

112
Id. at 975-76; see also Lawrence G. Sager, Some Observations About Race, Sex, and
Equal Protection, 59 TUL. L. REV. 928, 936-37 (1985).
113

68 Ohio St. 3d 221, 626 N.E.2d 59 (1994).

114
See, e.g., Jennifer A. Klear, Comparison of the Federal Courts’ and the New Jersey
Supreme Court’s Treatments of Free Speech on Private Property: Where Won’t We Have the
Freedom to Speak Next?, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 589 (2002).
115
OHIO CONST. art. I, § 11 (emphasis added). For an in-depth analysis of the very similar
Pennsylvania provision, see Seth F. Kreimer, The Pennsylvania Constitution’s Protection of
Free Expression, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 12 (2002).
116

68 Ohio St. 3d at 222, 626 N.E.2d at 60 (citing Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507
(1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972)).
117
Id. at 222, 626 N.E.2d at 60-61 (citing Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74
(1980)).
118

Id. at 222-23, 626 N.E.2d at 61 (citing State ex rel. Rear Door Bookstore v. Tenth Dist.
Ct. App., 63 Ohio St. 3d 354, 588 N.E.2d 116 (1992)).
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is the proper basis for interpretation of Section 11, Article I of the Ohio
Constitution.”119 The court continued:
Furthermore, while Section 11 has an additional clause not found in the
First Amendment, the plain language of this section, when read in its
entirety, bans only the passing of a law that would restrain or abridge the
liberty of speech. When the First Amendment does not protect speech
that infringes on private property rights, Section 11 does not protect that
speech either.120
The court cited the decisions of other state courts rejecting similar claims,121 relying
on “horizontal federalism,” but did not analyze those decisions and did not even cite
the decisions recognizing such claims.122 State courts often look horizontally for
guidance from other state courts interpreting similar or identical state constitutional
provisions, rather than looking vertically to U.S. Supreme Court decisions
interpreting federal constitutional provisions.123 Labeled “horizontal federalism” by
G. Alan Tarr and M.C. Porter,124 this is a common feature of the NJF.
Justice Wright’s dissent characterized the decision as a “step backward” from
Arnold, provided a careful textual analysis, distinguished the precedents relied on by
the majority, and considered the cases in other states recognizing similar claims.125
As noted above,126 the court relied on a 1992, pre-Arnold decision for the
proposition that the Ohio free speech provision was “no broader” than the federal
First Amendment’s protection of free speech. That case involved a challenge to an
injunction closing an adult bookstore for a year as a public nuisance.127 The Ohio
Supreme Court affirmed the injunction without opinion, relying on the court of
appeals opinion, which it included as an appendix.128 The Ohio Court of Appeals
had followed the lead of the U.S. Supreme Court in upholding such injunctions,129

119
Id. at 223, 626 N.E.2d at 61. See also State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v.
Bond, 98 Ohio St. 3d 146, 150, 781 N.E.2d 180, 187 (2002). But see Office of Disciplinary
Counsel v. Gardner, 99 Ohio St. 3d 416, 420, 793 N.E.2d 425, 429-30 (2003).
120

68 Ohio St. 3d at 223, 626 N.E.2d at 61.

121

Id. at 223 n.1, 626 N.E.2d at 61 n.1.

122

See Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Private Property, Public Property: Shopping Centers and
Expressive Freedom in the States, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1229 (1999). Professor Friedelbaum
discusses Ohio’s Eastwood Mall case on pages 1243-45.
123

STATE SUPREME COURTS xxi-xxii (M.C. Porter & G. Alan Tarr eds., 1982).

124

Id.

125

68 Ohio St. 3d at 225-31, 626 N.E.2d at 62-67 (Wright, J., dissenting).

126

See supra note 118 and accompanying text.

127

State ex rel. Rear Door Bookstore v. Tenth Dist. Ct. App., 63 Ohio St. 3d 354, 588
N.E.2d 116 (1992).
128

Id. at 355, 588 N.E.2d at 118. I will leave it to Ohio practitioners, scholars, and judges
to assess the precedential force of such an “opinion.”
129

Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697 (1986).
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rejecting the contrary view of New York’s highest court.130 Assessing state
constitutional rulings from other jurisdictions on such adult-bookstore injunctions,
the Ohio Court of Appeals concluded: “In summary, decisions from our sister states
can be cited to support almost any point of view.”131
III. CASE-BY-CASE ADOPTIONISM VERSUS PROSPECTIVE LOCKSTEPPING
The Ohio decisions reveal an important point about the methods by which state
courts may choose to follow U.S. Supreme Court interpretations of the federal
Constitution. The first approach may be referred to in Barry Latzer’s terms—
“unreflective adoptionism.”132 This would describe state court decisions simply
applying federal analysis to a state clause without acknowledging the possibility of a
different outcome, or considering arguments in favor of such a different, or more
protective, outcome. This might be an accurate description of the pre-1993 stance of
the Ohio Supreme Court.133 The next approach, “reflective adoptionism,” would
describe a state court decision acknowledging the possibility of different state and
federal outcomes, considering the arguments in the specific case and, on balance,
deciding to apply the federal analysis to the state provision. Simmon-Harris v. Goff,
adopting federal establishment of religion doctrine, seems to reflect this approach.134
Finally, however, a state court might engage in “prospective lockstepping,” where it
announces that not only for the instant case, but also in the future, it will interpret the
state and federal clauses the same. This is what the court seemed to do in Robinette
(search and seizure), Eastwood Mall (free speech and assembly), and in the equal
protection cases. In Robinette,135 the court stated that search and seizure cases would
be evaluated by the federal constitutional standard, not just under the facts of that
case, but also in the future if there were “no persuasive reasons to find otherwise.”136
This approach purports to decide too much and to go beyond the court’s authority to
adjudicate cases. It could be argued that such an approach cannot be referred to as a
“holding,” because it goes far beyond the facts of the case and purports to prejudge
future cases. It is not even clear if it qualifies as dictum. Such statements, therefore,
should neither bind lawyers in their arguments nor the court itself in future cases.
Justice Robert Utter of the Supreme Court of Washington criticized the use of a
similar lockstep approach to interpreting that state’s equality provisions, labeling
such an approach a virtual “rewrite” of the state constitution without a constitutional
convention or the people’s consent.137 Ron Collins argued that lockstepping results
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63 Ohio St. 3d at 359, 362, 588 N.E.2d at 121, 123 (rejecting People ex rel. Arcara v.
Cloud Books, Inc., 503 N.E.2d 492 (N.Y. 1986)).
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in the “Problem of the Vanishing Constitution,”138 where the state constitution is
rendered a nullity, and the “Problem of Amending Without Amendments,”139 where
the court, in effect, amends the state constitution by linking it, prospectively, to
federal constitutional analysis. This is not a valid exercise of judicial review. The
power to amend the state constitution, even to link its interpretation to federal
constitutional doctrine, is a political power reserved to the state’s citizens.140
Earl Maltz has argued in favor of lockstepping, or “the theory that state
constitutional provisions should be interpreted to provide exactly the same
protections as their federal constitutional counterparts.”141 He seems clearly,
however, to be referring to case-by-case lockstepping, or adoptionism, rather than
the prospective approach. His argument is based on deference to the state legislative
and executive branches, and on a criticism of judicial activism.142 He contends:
In short, the substance of lockstep analysis is entirely consistent with the
basic concept of state autonomy. Of course, one can still attack the
standard verbal formulations of the lockstep approach, which seem to
suggest that U.S. Supreme Court decisions somehow create state
constitutional law. For lockstep courts, however, these flaws in
articulation have little impact on the practical results reached.143
I disagree with this assessment and contend that the Ohio Supreme Court’s
prospective lockstepping goes far beyond “flaws in articulation.” Rather, it has the
effect of snuffing out the independent research and analysis that must be undertaken
by lawyers, judges, professors, and students in order to make the Ohio Constitution,
as stated in Arnold, “a document of independent force.”144
IV. CONCLUSION
There are a number of tentative conclusions that may be reached based on this
selective analysis145 of the Ohio Supreme Court’s first decade of experience with the
138
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L. REV. 1095, 1111 (1985).
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Id. at 1116:
When a state court withdraws from a constitutional provision its independent legal
authority over state action, the court assumes a power that has been constitutionally
delegated to others. That power is the right of the people to “alter” their constitution.
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Williams, supra note 17, at 216-17 (discussing “lockstep” and “forced linkage”
amendments).
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Earl M. Maltz, Lockstep Analysis and the Concept of Federalism, 496 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 98, 99 (March 1988). See also Maltz, supra note 61.
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Maltz, supra note 141, at 101, 106.
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in State Courts Adopting Federal Constitutional Doctrine: Case-by-Case Adoptionism or
Prospective Lockstepping?, ___ WM. & MARY L. REV. ___ (2004) (forthcoming).
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I have not, for example, analyzed the Ohio state constitutional school finance
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New Judicial Federalism. First, the court is to be commended for taking the first
steps toward recognizing the Ohio Constitution as a document of independent
political146 and legal force. The Arnold decision, together with the others discussed
in this article, serve to alert the lower bench, the bar, the media, and students and
professors to the potential contained within state constitutions.
Next, to the extent that there is inconsistency to be detected in the Ohio Supreme
Court’s approach to the NJF, this has been true as well in most other states.147 State
courts are now confronting major constitutional litigation in controversial cases. The
NJF is still relatively new in Ohio. It is very far from being “settled.”148 The bar and
legal educators have a responsibility to engage in teaching and analysis concerning
state constitutional law, and not just in the area of rights protections.149 Oregon
Justice Hans A. Linde said that in order “to make an independent argument under the
state clause [it] takes homework—in texts, in history, in alternative approaches to
analysis.”150 This Symposium will go a long way toward meeting that challenge.
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In the words of former Justice Hans Linde of Oregon, “[W]hat the judicial decision
applies was first a political decision that others deemed worthy of constitutional magnitude.”
Hans Linde, Without “Due Process”: Unconstitutional Law in Oregon, 49 OR. L. REV. 125,
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